Sunday, November 9, 2008

Byzantine governmental policy

I first wrote this as an assessment of the process and results of our current intelligence classification and structure, (i.e., CIA, NSA, DHS,etc.) but another review makes clear that the principles involved apply to much more than the areas originally targeted. Following is the original post:

Governmental organizational policies are almost always going to evolve into incomprehensible and illogical quagmires.

Those struggling for solutions often find themselves victim to another human failing; fixating on foreground details, mistaking immediacy for importance. Inevitably this leads to bandaging the problem, and patting oneself on the back for creating such an effective "solution", when in fact only the symptom has been addressed. The actual problem requires emotional divestment and enlarged perspective.

In this particular case, the problem is not the byzantine system that has been implemented, but rather that the system is specified by personnel who have no business specifying these systems in the first place.

Instead of microanalyses of individual procedures, a better approach would be a reworking of the expectations of and requirements for the policy making individual, with a heavy emphasis on real-world experience, with a track record of proven results, and not someone who has developed their philosophy from inside the governmental structure.

This is the origin of the current system and it relies on political alliance and legal-writing skills, with a focus on self-advancement more than technical understanding and experience.

Once again, the politically adept emerge victorious over the socially-impaired genius. Lets stop rewarding idiocy and emotionalism and start giving the public a more positive view of intellectualism. I will talk about that dynamic later. For now, I suggest a reread of Dale Carnegie's book.

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